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2T H E AMERICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE RESURGENCE IN U N I O N 
ORGANIZING 
Kate Bronfenbrenner 
In the last two decades, unions around the globe have watched in dismay as 
employers and governments have hastened to replicate US economic pol-
icies, labour laws, and union avoidance strategies. The result has been a race 
to the bottom for every aspect of the employment relationship - whether 
safety and health, contract enforcement, job security, pension benefits, or the 
right to organize. 
In all of these areas, US employers have led the descent. Union density in 
the USA has dropped to 14 per cent for the first time in more than 60 years. 
For the last two decades, unions have been able to gain representation for 
fewer than 100,000 workers each year, far fewer than the 400,000 union jobs 
that are lost each year from plant closings, lay-offs, corporate restructuring, 
decertifications, and contracting out. Instead of the union-friendly labour law 
reform that unions hoped to achieve under a Democratic administration, 
they now watch as conservatives at all levels of government pursue an 
aggressive campaign to undercut severely all protective labour legislation. 
Deregulation, privatization, and liberalized trade policies threaten the 
security of workers throughout the economy. 
Yet, at the dawn of a new century, the American labour movement shows 
signs of resurgence that make it as much a model for renewal as a prototype 
for decline. This resurgence is evident on the political front, where, through 
grassroots education and mobilization of their members and community 
allies, American unions have recently won victories in Congress on issues 
such as the minimum wage and maintaining restrictions on company unions. 
It is also evident in a series of recent bargaining victories at Verizon, Boeing, 
Kaiser Aluminum, United Parcel Service, and Continental Tire, where, 
through the use of creative and aggressive strategic campaigns, unions have 
successfully challenged some of the world's most powerful corporations. 
We also see evidence of labour's revival in the new wave of student activism 
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that has swept across American college campuses with a focus on anti-
sweatshop campaigns and support for unionized campus service-workers. 
And we have witnessed a sea change in media attention to labour issues, with 
union victories and concerns making front-page news for the first time in 
decades. 
But it is in organizing that the US labour movement's efforts at renewal 
have been most dramatic. Despite a rapidly deteriorating economic, political, 
and legal climate, for the last several years the AFL-CIO (the US national 
trade union federation), along with national and local unions, have together 
been engaged in an aggressive effort to improve significantly their organizing 
capacity and success. This has included shifting staff and financial resources 
into organizing, mobilizing leaders and members to support organizing 
campaigns, and developing and implementing more effective organizing 
strategies and tactics. 
Recent victories such as the 74,000 homecare workers organized by the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in Los Angeles, California; 
the nearly 10,000 workers organized by the Hotel and Restaurant Employees 
(HERE) at the MGM and Bellagio hotels in Las Vegas; the more than 26,000 
airline reservation agents organized by the Communication Workers of 
America (CWA) at USAIRWAYS and the Machinists at United Airlines; or the 
recent Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) 
victory for 5000 textile workers at Fieldcrest Cannon in North Carolina prove 
that some unions are winning, and winning big, even when faced with 
extremely aggressive employer opposition. More than that, we have seen a 
national commitment at the highest levels of the AFL-CIO and many of its 
largest affiliates to commit more resources to organizing and to 'organize 
at an unprecedented pace and scale' (Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-
Thompson, 1995). 
Slowly but surely these changes and initiatives are beginning to bear fruit. 
In 1998, for the first time in decades, American unions organized as many 
new workers as were lost from lay-offs, plant closings, decertifications, and 
contracting out. Unions won 1653 private sector representation elections 
involving 105,624 eligible voters. This is a 31 per cent increase from the 
80,421 workers involved in National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) elec-
tions won by unions in 1996 and a 58 per cent increase in the number 
involved in winning elections in 1995. After a twenty-year decline, private 
sector first contract rates also increased to 68 per cent in 1998 from a low of 
60 per cent in 1995 (BNA Plus, 1999). Unions also continue actively to 
organize state and local government workers in the American public sector 
while tens of thousands of US private sector workers are now seeking to 
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organize outside of the traditional government supervised and regulated 
election process through community-based and industry-based direct pres-
sure campaigns calling on employers to recognize the union and bargain a 
first agreement without going through a lengthy election process. 
Many of these organizing gains were with new workers in new industries. 
More than half of the new workers organized are in health care, social ser-
vices, hotel, entertainment, and other service sector units where women and 
people of colour predominate. Non-traditional community-based campaigns 
have been particularly effective among leased and contract employees such as 
janitors and home-health aides, construction workers, and low-wage workers 
in the hospitality industry. Not only are the majority of these workers women 
and people of colour, but many are new immigrants from Asia, Latin 
America, and the Carribean (BNA Plus, 1999). 
By 1999, the combination of organizing victories and employment 
expansion in unionized industries resulted in a net gain of 265,000 in union 
membership, the first such gain in more than twenty years (AFL-CIO, 2000). 
The great American decline in union organizing may have finally bottomed 
out. Yet, in order to reverse the decline in organizing and regain their power 
at the bargaining table and in the broader community, American unions are 
going to have to organize millions, not hundreds of thousands, of workers 
each year. We can only hope that other nations learn both from our mistakes 
and our belated attempts at revitalization, so that they can stem their own 
decline before it reaches the same depths as in the USA. 
The legal framework for organizing in the USA 
The legal right to organize and to collective bargaining was first extended to 
the majority of private sector workers in the USA with the passage of the 
National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935. Today the NLRA covers the 
right to organize and collectively bargain for all private sector workers with 
the exception of railway and airline employees, who are covered under the 
Railway Labor Act; and domestic workers, agricultural workers, independent 
contractors, supervisors and managerial employees, who are excluded from 
all private sector collective bargaining legislation. Workers in federal, state, 
and local government did not gain legal protection for the right to organize 
until the 1960s and 1970s, and only then on a state-by-state basis. Today there 
are 43 different public sector labour relations laws and agencies in 37 states 
outlining the right to organize for government workers in those states. In 
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thirteen states, mostly in the south and south-west, there are no collective 
bargaining laws covering public sector workers. 
Private sector labour laws in the USA are administered by the NLRB and 
enforced by federal courts, whereas state labour laws are administered by state 
labour relations agencies and enforced by state courts. Most state labour laws 
mimic federal labour law in the procedures and regulations relating to 
organizing. These laws grant workers the right to organize and to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing and outline union 
and employer 'unfair labour practices', which are actions by either the union 
or the company that interfere with, threaten, penalize, or coerce workers in 
the exercise of these rights. When workers or unions believe the employer has 
committed unfair labour practices they file charges with the NLRB. However, 
because penalties for most employer violations are fairly minimal and include 
nei ther criminal penalties nor punitive damages, the law provides little dis-
incentive for those employers de termined to remain non-union. 
The primary route to union representation in the USA is through the 
NLRB certification election process. Unde r this procedure a min imum of 30 
per cent of workers in a specified bargaining unit (a group of workers which 
the NLRB believes have sufficient community of interest to bargain collec-
tively for a single contract with the employer) petition the NLRB, ei ther 
through individual signed authorization cards or multiple signatures on 
petition, to hold a secret ballot election to de termine whether a majority of 
employees seek to be represented by the union . 
Because of high turnover and inevitable loss of support for the union in 
response to aggressive employer anti-union campaigns, most unions wait 
until they have at least 70 per cent of the workers signed u p prior to peti-
tioning the NLRB. If the union can prove that the majority of the bargaining 
unit has signed a petition (or cards) authorizing the union to represent them 
in collective bargaining, then, prior to peti t ioning the NLRB, the union can 
go directly to the employer to d e m a n d that the employer voluntarily recog-
nize the union as the exclusive representative for the workers in that bar-
gaining unit and commence bargaining a first agreement , without first going 
through an election. Although in the public sector voluntary recognitions are 
quite common, in the private sector they are extremely rare and only happen 
in the context of extraordinary efforts by the union to leverage the employer 
to agree to recognize the union without first going through the certification 
election process. 
In most cases, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily and 
the union petitions the NLRB for a certification election. The NLRB then 
schedules a secret ballot election, on average, 30 to 50 days after the petition 
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is filed. However, the election can be delayed by weeks, or even years, in those 
cases where the employer contests the appropriateness of the bargaining unit 
petitioned for by the union. 
If the union wins a majority of the votes in the election (50 per cent plus 
one), or if the employer voluntarily recognizes the union, the NLRB certifies 
the union as the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining for that unit. That means that for at least one year after the unit is 
certified, or for as long as any collective bargaining agreement is in effect, no 
other union may bargain with the employer on behalf of workers in this unit. 
Once the union is certified the employer is required under the law to bargain 
in good faith in an attempt to reach an agreement. There is no requirement 
to reach an agreement and the only penalty for employers who refuse to 
bargain in good faith is a court order ordering them to go back to the 
bargaining table to attempt to reach an agreement. 
The roots of the decline in US organizing 
Many in the US labour movement mistakenly believe that their organizing 
problems began with President Reagan's anti-union initiatives in the 1980s. 
However, unlike other industrial countries, where free market economic 
policies and the recent dismantling of protective labour legislation have, in 
just a few short years, devastated union organizing efforts, the decline in US 
union density and organizing success began decades before the Reagan era. 
As long as US companies and their employees were reaping the benefits of an 
expanding world economy in the 1950s and 1960s, union leaders were able to 
keep their heads in the sand, ignoring the devastating long-term implications 
of a deteriorating legal, economic, and political climate. The full force of 
these environmental changes was not felt until the 1980s, too late easily to 
institute the serious strategic and structural changes necessary to reverse the 
decline. 
In the 1930s and early 1940s US unions greatly increased their membership 
and power through aggressive organizing in the context of an expanding 
economy and a favourable political and social climate. In the decades that 
followed, actual union membership remained fairly stable, but overall density 
declined because unions failed to keep up with a rapidly expanding work-
force. Some of this decline can be attributed to a series of structural changes 
in the US economy and workforce, including increased capital mobility, 
technological change, and changes in work organization, which have resulted 
in both significant job losses in unionized industries and dramatic growth in 
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the largely unorganized service sector. These pressures on unionized indus-
tries were further exacerbated by government economic initiatives such as 
deregulation and free-trade policies (Bronfenbrenner et al, 1998). 
The changing labour law climate has also contributed to the decline. 
Union density peaked in the late 1940s, just before the enactment of the 
Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labour Relations Act, which 
codified into law the pro-business decisions of a much more conservative, 
post-New Deal judiciary. Taft-Hartley expanded employer rights to oppose 
unions at the same time as it removed one of labour's most effective 
organizing tools: the secondary boycott. Reflecting the Cold War hysteria of 
the time, Taft-Hartley also included a clause requiring unions to sign 'non-
communist' affidavits if they wanted to be covered under the Act. In the years 
that followed an entire generation of the industrial labour movement's best 
organizers were purged from their unions for being communists, socialists, 
or 'fellow travellers'. With them went a wealth of strategic knowledge and 
organizing experience that is only now being regained, more than two gen-
erations later (Green, 1980: 195-205). 
Although the decline in union density started in the years after Taft-
Hartley, the true effect of these labour law changes was masked by the 
expanding economy. During the 1950s and 1960s unions focused their efforts 
on servicing their existing members rather than organizing industries and 
sectors that had been untouched by the wave of industrial organizing in the 
1930s. It was not until the US post-war economic boom first faltered in the 
1970s, and unions first began to lose significant numbers through lay-offs, 
plant closings, and capital flight, that they felt the full force of their weakened 
labour rights. For now when they tried to organize they found employers 
committed to containing unionization to already-organized industries and 
aggressively opposing all union efforts to organize the unorganized. 
Unions were ill prepared for the employers' onslaught. Earlier in the cen-
tury in the textile mills in Lawrence, Massachusetts, or in the auto-plants in 
Flint, Michigan, organizers understood that their success depended on run-
ning slow, underground, community-based campaigns. Faced with employers 
who readily spied on, beat up, fired, blacklisted, and evicted workers for the 
slightest evidence of union sympathy, these organizers went house to house, 
neighbourhood to neighbourhood, building leaders, capitalizing on com-
munity networks and allies, and steadily preparing for more aggressive action 
(Kraus, 1947: 1-87; Cameron 1993: 117-69). For most industrial unions in the 
1950s and 1960s, however, organizing involved no more than handing out 
authorization cards outside the plant gate, followed by a few large meetings 
and some mass mailings. For other unions, particularly the building trades 
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and the Teamsters, most organizing was accomplished top down, through 
visits by union officers to non-union employers. These strategies worked as 
long as unions controlled the market share of the industry and employer 
opposition was minimal. But once employers became more aggressive in their 
opposition to unions in the 1970s and 1980s, both union organizing activity 
and union organizing success plummeted (Chaison and Rose, 1991: 26). 
As unions grew weaker, employers became more emboldened and 
sophisticated in their union-avoidance strategies. An entire industry of 
management consultants sprang up, feeding off employers eager to spare no 
expense to keep their workplaces 'union-free'. By the mid-1980s employers 
used anti-union consultants in 71 per cent of private sector union organizing 
campaigns (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1995). By 1995 the number had 
increased to 90 per cent (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b). 
Illegal anti-union activity also increased. According to Richard Freeman: 
From 1960 to 1980 the number of all employer unfair labour practice 
charges rose fourfold; the number of charges involving a firing for union 
activity rose threefold; and the number of workers awarded back pay or 
reinstated into their jobs rose fivefold. (Freeman, 1985: 53) 
By 1980, the overwhelming majority of employers aggressively opposed union 
organizing efforts through a combination of delays, harassment, discharges, 
misinformation, interrogation, threats, promises, bribes, and surveillance 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1994). Emboldened by President Reagan's unequivocal 
support for their anti-union agenda, as demonstrated by his discharge and 
replacement of striking air-traffic controllers, many openly flaunted labour 
law, secure in the knowledge that the penalties for even the most egregious 
violations were little more than a slap on the wrist. 
Today, more than one-third of US employers discharge workers for union 
activity during organizing campaigns, more than half threaten a full or par-
tial shutdown of their company if the union succeeds in organizing the 
facility, and between 15 and 40 per cent make illegal changes in wages, 
benefits and working conditions, give bribes to those who oppose the union, 
or use electronic surveillance of union activists during the organizing cam-
paign (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b). In short, US employers faced with orga-
nizing campaigns, stop at nothing to create a climate so fraught with fear, 
conflict, suspicion, and intimidation, that workers long for the time before 
the union drive began. 
Employers in the USA engage in these aggressive actions with little fear of 
any significant legal penalties from the NLRB or the courts. Even in the most 
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serious cases, such as the CWA's 1994 campaign at Sprint's Hispanic mar-
keting division in San Francisco - where the NLRB and the courts found 
Sprint guilty of more than 50 egregious labour law violations during the 
organizing campaigns, including fabricating evidence, bribes, threats, sur-
veillance, discharges, and ultimately shutting down and transferring work in 
direct response to the union campaign - the only penalty was an order to 
refrain from engaging in similar violations if they were ever to open again. 
Not surprisingly, the intensity of these employer campaigns has had a 
devastating impact on union organizing success. Research has consistently 
found that most individual anti-union employer tactics are associated with 
union win rates 10 to 20 per cent lower than in units where they are not 
utilized. In addition, when included in a regression equation controlling for 
the influence of election background, bargaining-unit demographics, and 
union tactic variables, these individual employer actions decrease the prob-
ability that the union will win the election by between 3 per cent and 22 per 
cent, whereas each additional aggressive anti-union tactic the employer uses 
reduces the probability of the union winning the election by 7 per cent 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1994, 1997b; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). 
Given the evidence, it is not surprising that many researchers have con-
cluded that employer opposition and weak and poorly enforced labour laws 
are the primary causes of the declining organizing success of US unions. Yet, 
unions in the USA cannot simply blame external factors for their failure to 
organize. They themselves must take a significant share of the blame. In the 
1950s and 1960s, when unions had the resources and power to launch 
massive organizing campaigns, taking on entire industries, they failed to do 
so. Equally damaging, they completely ignored, and in many cases con-
sciously neglected, whole sectors of the economy because they were domin-
ated by low-wage women and people of colour (Bronfenbrenner et al, 1998). 
In part this was due to prejudice but it was also due to the mistaken belief 
that these workers were less interested in unions and these industries were 
more difficult to organize. Many unions have held on to this belief in the 
1990s, despite the fact that research has consistently shown that women 
workers, low-wage service workers, and people of colour are just as likely, if 
not more likely, to organize (Bronfenbrenner, 1993). 
For decades US unions also neglected to organize professional, technical, 
and clerical workers in white-collar occupations, once again convinced that 
these workers were less interested in unions than their blue-collar counter-
parts. This changed somewhat in the 1960s and 1970s, when, with the advent 
of public sector collective bargaining, public sector teachers, office workers, 
and administrators began to flock to unions in droves. Although by the 
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1990s, only 16 per cent of the total US workforce was employed by state, local, 
and federal government entities, a third of the workers represented by AFL-
CIO affiliates were employed in the public sector and public sector union 
density stabilized above 35 per cent. These public sector workers were able to 
organize into unions and bargain first agreements largely free of the 
aggressive employer opposition that is so prevalent in the private sector, 
which explains why public sector white-collar workers have been so much 
more likely to organize than their private sector counterparts (Juravich and 
Bronfenbrenner, 1998). 
In the 1970s, with the elimination of the healthcare worker exclusion from 
the National Labour Relations Act, there was a burst of organizing activity 
among private sector hospital and nursing home employees. Similarly in the 
1980s, unions such as District 65 of the United Auto Workers (UAW) won 
several major campaigns among university clerical workers. Coupled with 
victories in the public sector, these efforts brought thousands of women and 
people of colour into the labour movement. Yet even these gains were not 
enough to stop the haemorrhaging of union membership in labours' former 
strongholds in auto, steel, construction, electronics, and textiles (Bronfen-
brenner et al, 1988). 
Even by the 1980s, when it was difficult for any union leader in the USA to 
ignore the hard numbers of labour's decline, few unions were willing or able 
to rise to the organizing challenge. Instead, most concentrated their 
resources on servicing and bargaining for a shrinking membership. The 
majority of those that did organize ran very weak top-down organizing 
campaigns, which were no match for most employers. Some unions were 
organizing and winning despite employer opposition, however, and despite 
the deteriorating organizing climate. The challenge for the US labour 
movement was to determine why these unions were more successful and 
which tactics and strategies contributed most to their success. 
Factors contributing to union organizing success 
Although there has been extensive research on factors contributing to the 
decline in union organizing in the USA, very few studies have examined the 
role played by union tactics in the organizing process. In part this is because 
many industrial relations researchers are not convinced that union tactics 
play a significant role in determining election outcomes. Some, like Dickens 
(1983), believe that union tactics are entirely reactive, determined solely by 
management tactics, and therefore should not and do not need to be 
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included in organizing research models. Others may believe that union 
tactics matter, but are unable to include them in their research models, both 
because they have limited understanding of the tactics that unions have 
available to them in organizing drives, and because they lack access to union 
campaign data. Thus most industrial relations research on private sector 
organizing in the USA continues to focus primarily on the election, unit, and 
employer variables easily accessible in NLRB databases. 
In 1988, in cooperation with the Organizing Department of the AFL-CIO, I 
launched the first of a series of studies specifically designed to expand the 
body of knowledge available to the labour movement and scholars of the 
labour movement regarding factors contributing to union success or failure 
in certification election campaigns. Through surveys of leading organizers in 
private and public sector organizing campaigns, we have been able to 
determine which union tactics have the most positive impact on union 
organizing success while controlling for the impact of election environment, 
organizer background, bargaining unit demographics, and employer char-
acteristics and tactics (Bronfenbrenner, 1993, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Bron-
fenbrenner andjuravich 1998; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1998). 
The findings from these studies have been consistent and clear. Unions 
that win elections in the context of aggressive employer opposition, tend to 
run very different campaigns from those that lose. In fact, union strategies 
and tactics were found as a group to matter just as much, if not more, in 
determining election outcomes than other groups of variables including 
bargaining unit demographics, employer characteristics and tactics, and the 
broader organizing climate. This is one of the most striking findings of the 
research because this means that the one element of the election process that 
US unions control, namely their own organizing strategy and tactics, can 
make a significant difference in determining whether they win or lose elec-
tions, even in a hostile organizing climate. 
What we found is that unions are most likely to win certification election 
campaigns when they run aggressive and creative campaigns utilizing a grass-
roots, rank-and-file intensive strategy, building a union and acting like a union 
from the very beginning of the campaign. Thus, campaigns where the union 
focused on person-to-person contact, house calls, and small-group meetings to 
develop leadership and union consciousness and inoculate workers against the 
employer's anti-union strategy were associated with significantly higher win 
rates than traditional campaigns, which primarily utilized gate leafleting, mass 
meetings, and glossy mailings to contact unorganized workers. 
This is not to say that there is something inherently wrong with leaflets and 
mailings during organizing campaigns. Rather, what our research shows is 
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that these leaflets and mailings act as a proxy for traditional campaigns where 
the union's energy is focused on indirect means of communication rather 
than on the personal contact and leadership development necessary to build 
the union and counteract the employer campaign. Unlike leaflets and 
mailings, person-to-person contact through house calls and small group 
meetings is an essential and effective means for organizers to listen to 
workers' concerns, allay their fears, and mobilize them around the justice 
and dignity issues that matter enough to them to challenge the employer and 
win, regardless of the brutality and intensity of the employer campaign. 
Unions were also more successful when they encouraged rank-and-file 
participation in and responsibility for the organizing campaign. More than 
any other single variable, having a large, active, rank-and-file committee 
representative of all the different interest groups in the bargaining unit was 
found to be critical to union organizing success, increasing the probability 
of the union winning the election by as much as 20 per cent. With 
employers aggressively campaigning against the union eight hours a day in 
the workplace, these committees are the most effective vehicles for gen-
erating the worker participation and commitment necessary to counteract 
the fears and misinformation created by the employer campaign. Repre-
sentative rank-and-file committees are also essential in order for the union 
to keep in touch with the issues and concerns of the workers they are 
attempting to organize. But perhaps most important of all, these commit-
tees give workers a sense of ownership of the union and the organizing 
campaign and a sense that they are part of a democratic and inclusive 
organization. Rank-and-file leadership and ownership of the union cam-
paign also make it much more difficult for the employer to paint the union 
as an outside third party. 
Escalating pressure tactics in the workplace and the community such as 
petitions, mass grievances, T-shirt or button days, rallies, public forums, or 
leveraging the employer through suppliers, investors, stockholders or cus-
tomers, were also found to have a significant positive impact on union 
organizing success. These actions are important because they build worker 
solidarity, develop leadership, reinforce commitment among pro-union 
workers and help to convince undecided voters that they can safely support 
the union. These tactics also actively demonstrate support for the union 
among the workers and the broader community and can therefore compel 
the employer to scale back its anti-union campaign. 
According to our findings, union success also depends on developing a 
long-range campaign strategy that incorporates building for the first contract 
into the original organizing process. Union win rates were significantly 
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higher in campaigns where the union started prepar ing for the first contract 
before the election by conduct ing bargaining surveys, selecting the bar-
gaining committee, and involving the workers in researching and prepar ing 
proposals. These tactics are impor tant because they build worker confidence 
that the union is going to win the election and successfully bargain a first 
agreement and because they demonstra te to the workers that they are going 
to play an active role in the collective bargaining process. 
Unions are also more successful in organizing when there is an emphasis 
on developing a culture of organizing that permeates everything that the 
union does. This includes a serious commitment of staff and financial 
resources to organizing at both the local and international levels. Organizing 
costs money - for staff, training, cars, gas, hotels, literature, computers , and 
phones . In a time of declining members and dues, most unions are strug-
gling with how best to allocate increasingly scarce resources. Thus, unions 
will only be successful in transferring sufficient resources into organizing if 
they are able to convince union leaders and their members that the future of 
their union depends on organizing, and organizing depends on transferring 
resources from servicing to organizing. 
O n e of the most effective ways to mobilize membership support for 
organizing is through the recruitment, training, and utilization of member 
organizers from already-organized units. These volunteers are not only 
important because they can inexpensively supplement scarce organizing staff 
resources. Their most impor tant contribution is in their ability to speak 
sincerely and powerfully from their own experiences of organizing and 
winning a first contract. Much more than paid professional organizers, these 
volunteers can credibly convince unorganized workers that not only is it 
possible to organize and win but it is also worth the risk, fear, and conflict 
that it takes to do so. 
Lastly, union organizing success depends on strategic research and tar-
geting that carefully assesses whether the workers are really ready to organize; 
whether the union has the expertise, experience, and resources to organize 
workers in this industry; and perhaps most important of all, whether the 
union has the leverage to gain a first contract for the workers once the 
election is won. 
At a time when private sector union density has d ropped down to 9 per 
cent and most union organizing campaigns barely get off the ground, unions 
can ill afford to waste precious time and resources on campaigns they are 
doomed to lose. They need to focus their energies on the workers and units 
where they are most likely to win, and on the units that, once won, will have 
the greatest impact on s t rengthening their bargaining power in their existing 
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units. Unions that attempt to organize any type of worker in any industry, 
with no regard to the workers' experience or bargaining leverage in the 
enterprise, community, or industry, risk seriously diluting their power, and 
the power of other unions, at a time when they most need to concentrate 
their power in any way they can. 
In the late 1980s, when the first of these organizing studies was conducted, 
we found many of the individual components of the comprehensive strategy 
described above to be associated with win rates 10 to 30 per cent higher than 
win rates in campaigns that did not use those tactics (Bronfenbrenner 
1997a). The tactics associated with the highest win rates included having a 
representative committee; house calling the majority of the unit; using 
escalating pressure tactics such as solidarity days; establishing a rank-and-file 
bargaining committee before the election; using member volunteer organ-
izers; and focusing on issues of dignity and justice rather than just bread-and-
butter issues. We also found that when union building tactics were included 
in a regression equation controlling for the influence of other election 
campaign variables, most were associated with as much as a 3 per cent 
increase in the percentage of votes received by the union and as much as a 10 
per cent increase in the probability of the union winning the elections. The 
probability of the union winning the election also increased by 10 per cent 
for each additional union building tactic used by the union during the 
organizing campaign (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). 
Unfortunately, the study also found that, in the late 1980s, only a very small 
number of unions were using a comprehensive union building strategy in 
their certification election campaigns. Fewer than a third of the unions 
surveyed had representative committees, house called the majority of the 
members of the unit, held ten or more small-group meetings, or focused 
on dignity and fairness as the primary issues. Even fewer started preparing 
for the first contract before the election or used escalating pressure tactics 
such as solidarity days, community coalitions, rallies, job actions or media 
campaigns. 
Unions were able to win every election in the extremely small number of 
campaigns (3 per cent) where the union ran a comprehensive campaign 
using five or more of the union building tactics described above. However 
the win rate was only 41 per cent in campaigns where they used fewer than 
five union-building tactics. 
Since that time, we have conducted two follow-up studies of NLRB election 
campaigns, one of elections that took place in 1994 and one of elections that 
took place between 1993 and 1995 (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b, 1997c; Bron-
fenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). Although overall the results from these 
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studies are consistent with the findings from the 1980s study there are two 
important differences. First, although employer campaigns have dramatically 
increased in intensity and effectiveness, the nature and intensity of union 
campaigns have increased to a much smaller extent. It is true that more 
unions are committing more staff and financial resources to organizing, and 
more are also using representative committees, person-to-person contact, 
and escalating pressure tactics, and preparing for the first contract during 
the organizing campaign. However, although the percentage of employers 
that run aggressive campaigns increased from 21 per cent to 64 per cent, the 
percentage of unions that run aggressive campaigns increased from 3 per 
cent to only 30 per cent. 
Second, in the 1990s individual union tactics variables were found to be 
associated with win rates only 2 per cent to 16 per cent higher than cam-
paigns in which the tactics were not used. A few tactics, when measured 
individually, such as house calling the majority of the unit, were now asso-
ciated with lower win rates than campaigns where they were not used. In the 
30 per cent of the campaigns where the union did use five or more union 
building tactics the win rate was 50 per cent, compared to 36 per cent where 
they used fewer than five tactics and 27 per cent where no union building 
tactics were used. More important, for the 6 per cent of the campaigns where 
the union ran a true multifaceted comprehensive campaign, using ten or 
more union building tactics, the win rate increased to 72 per cent (Bron-
fenbrenner, 1997c). When a variable measuring the number of union tactics 
used was included in a regression equation controlling for the influence of 
other election campaign variables, including employer tactics, the probability 
of the union winning the election increased by 9 per cent for each additional 
union building tactic used. At the same time the probability of the union 
winning the election declined by 7 per cent for each additional anti-union 
tactic the employer used (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). 
The results of the 1990s data show that, in the USA today, when employer 
campaigns are dramatically increasing in their intensity and the broader 
economic, social and political climate is becoming more and more hostile to 
organizing, the strategies and tactics that unions use matter now, more than 
ever. However, there are no silver bullets; there is no single tactic that 
guarantees union victory. Instead union success depends on utilizing a 
multifaceted comprehensive strategy incorporating as many rank-and-file 
intensive union building strategies as possible, including person-to-person 
contact, rank-and-file leadership development, escalating pressure tactics, 
and building for the first contract during the organizing campaign. The 
more comprehensive and multifaceted the union strategy is during an 
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organizing campaign, the more union building strategies it uses, the more 
likely it is to win the election. 
The data also show that in the last ten years more and more organizers are 
beginning to try to run more aggressive organizing campaigns. However, 
their approach to organizing has been piecemeal. They have been adding 
one or two new tactics to their traditional organizing practice without 
incorporating them into a more cohesive and comprehensive strategy. Thus 
more unions may be house calling the majority of the unit, but if they are 
using only professional staff to conduct the house calls, without building an 
effective rank-and-file committee and without using volunteer organizers 
from other units, those house calls are much less effective. More unions are 
also using representative committees, but because they are not always actively 
involving them in an aggressive and creative campaign, their positive impact 
is greatly muted. We also see more unions resorting to external pressure 
tactics targeted at investors, suppliers, or customers, both in voluntary 
recognition and first contract campaigns. 
We found evidence in our research that in the past few years the shortage of 
skilled, experienced organizers, particularly women and people of colour, has 
reached crisis proportions. Today, just as ten years ago, just over half of the 
campaigns had the needed ratio of one full-time organizer per 100 eligible 
voters. Even more disturbing, where ten years ago 12 per cent of lead orga-
nizers were women and 15 per cent were people of colour, today the per-
centage of women lead organizers has only increased to 16 per cent and the 
percentage of lead organizers who are people of colour has actually dropped 
to 9 per cent. Even in campaigns with a majority of women, only 23 per cent 
have a woman lead organizer, while in campaigns with a majority of workers of 
colour, only 16 per cent have a person of colour as the lead organizer. This 
occurs despite the fact that win rates are significantly higher in units with a 
majority of women with a woman lead organizer (50 per cent versus 39 per 
cent for a male lead organizer) and in units with a majority of workers of 
colour for a lead organizer of colour (64 per cent versus 35 per cent). 
Significant gains have been made in recruiting more women and people of 
colour to staff organizing campaigns. Today more than 40 per cent of all 
NLRB campaigns and 58 per cent of campaigns in primarily female units 
have at least one woman organizer staffing or leading the campaign, whereas 
a third of all campaigns and 58 per cent of campaigns with a majority of 
workers of colour have at least one person of colour on staff or leading the 
campaign. Most of these organizers are African-American or Hispanic, 
whereas fewer than 2 per cent are Asian, despite the large numbers of Asian 
workers currently participating in organizing campaigns. 
46 
Conclusion 
T H E AMERICAN LABOUR M O V E M E N T 
Our research on organizing campaigns clearly demonstrates that, in the 
1990s, more unions in the USA were consistently adopting the more com-
prehensive approach that is required to win elections in the current organ-
izing climate. Not surprisingly, it is these unions that have won the lion's 
share of the union victories in recent years. These are also the unions that are 
committing the most resources to organizing, recruiting the most women 
and people of colour to their organizing staff, running the most election 
campaigns, winning the largest units, and are contributing the most to the 
recent upturn in union organizing numbers. Unfortunately they still repre-
sent the minority, which is why the US labour movement remains so far from 
organizing the millions of new workers it needs to regain its bargaining and 
political power. 
There is no question that free market economic policies, liberalized trade 
practices, and the elimination or weakening of protective labour legislation 
have greatly increased the costs and risks to workers and unions attempting 
to organize in every nation. But the findings from our organizing contract 
research also hold out the promise and possibility that unions can organize 
and win, even in the most hostile organizing climate, if they are willing to 
commit to a much more costly and comprehensive organizing strategy. 
But they cannot delay. For too many decades unions in the USA failed to 
accept responsibility for their declining numbers and power. Not only did 
they continue to blame external forces for their organizing difficulties, but 
they also continued to seek to be rescued by their political allies, blinded by 
the belief that any organizing renewal was entirely dependent on first 
achieving significant labour law reform. In doing so they failed to understand 
that the deteriorating legal climate for organizing has always been a direct 
result of their declining numbers and political power. In fact, only through 
organizing massive numbers of new members in every sector of the economy, 
will US unions once again have the political leverage to ensure more pro-
gressive and more effective labour legislation. 
This organizing will need to be achieved through massive numbers of 
NLRB elections in larger and larger units but increasingly it will also need to 
go beyond the traditional board certification election process to organize 
workers in industries and occupations that are either too large, too diffuse, or 
too contingent, to be successfully organized under the certification election 
model. For these employers, many of whom are the richest and most pow-
erful multinational corporations in the world, what is required is a compre-
hensive campaign simultaneously organizing the rank-and-file workers in the 
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workplace and the community from the bottom up, while leveraging the 
employer through its investors, suppliers, customers, owners, and subsidiaries 
from the top down. 
As difficult as it is to achieve, a certification election victory is just the first 
step in the organizing process. For, without a first agreement, there are no 
new members, no contract gains, and the union often ends up being 
decertified or withdrawing in a few years. Despite progress on the organizing 
front, today the overall private sector first contract rate is only 60 per cent. 
This means that fewer than a quarter of the private sector workers who 
attempt to organize under the NLRB are able to gain representation under a 
union contract. 
This high failure rate occurs both because the majority of employers 
continue their anti-union campaign after the election is won and because the 
majority of unions fail to continue an aggressive, rank-and-file intensive 
strategy after the election campaign. What our research has found is that 
unions' success in winning first agreements and staying organized after the 
first contract is reached depends on continuing and intensifying the same 
kind of multifaceted, rank-and-file intensive campaign that is so essential to 
the initial organizing campaign. The organizing never stops. 
But unions engaging in such organizing cannot and should not assume 
that they are simply mobilizing new workers to become dues payers for the 
status quo. Workers who organize today are not going to be willing to take on 
the risks or put in the hard work of organizing if they are not going to be 
given a voice and a seat at the table once the union has won. These new 
workers will come into the labour movement with new issues and new 
demands and with the expectation that the union will continue to be the 
same activist and democratic organization it was during the organizing 
campaign through the first contract and beyond. 
Nor can we assume that there is some other, less difficult and less 
adversarial, model that would more gently convince employers to grant 
union recognition and utilize new, more collaborative, industrial relations 
strategies for the new millennium. The evidence from the last decade is very 
clear. Employers in the USA today, whether foreign-based multinationals or 
US-based family businesses, manufacturing or healthcare, high tech or low 
wage, will not and do not voluntarily recognize unions in the absence of the 
expression of union power in the workplace and broader community. 
For many years labour's declining political power in the USA was cush-
ioned by the post-World War II economic boom. By the time most of the US 
labour movement woke up and recognized that they were in a crisis, they 
faced a hostile President and a global market economy. For other industrial 
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nations the crisis has developed much later and much more quickly. But 
today, whether in Great Britain, Brazil, Korea, or New Zealand, it is no less 
acute. 
Unions in the USA are learning that, even in the most hostile organizing 
climate, workers do organize and unions can win, if they are willing to 
commit to a more aggressive and comprehensive organizing strategy which 
slowly but steadily builds the union from the bot tom up. This is how unions 
everywhere have always had to organize in the absence of strong enforceable 
protective labour legislation and this is how more and more unions a round 
the world will have to organize in an era of free markets, free trade, dereg-
ulation, and multinational corporate restructuring. It is a great challenge, 
but it is also a great opportunity, to build a stronger, and more uni ted labour 
movement a round the globe. 
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